Commentary on four papers on the impact of capital requirements on bank risk taking: empirical evidence by Stephen P. Cechetti
FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 47
Commentary
Stephen G. Cecchetti
This session contains four interesting papers that are
brought together by the following important question:
What does it mean for a bank to be capital constrained?
Put slightly differently, the papers by Ediz, Michael, and
Perraudin; Aggarwal and Jacques; Yonetani and Katsuo;
and Le and Sheehan all attempt to measure how banks react
to the presence of capital requirements. In the following, I
will summarize and comment on what I believe to be the
primary focus of each of these four papers as it relates to
this question. I will then close with some general remarks.
The first paper, by Ediz, Michael, and Perraudin,
entitled “The Impact of Capital Requirements on U.K.
Bank Behaviour,” examines the behavior of British banks
near the regulatory trigger levels for capital, as set by the
examining authorities in the United Kingdom. The
authors ask the very interesting question: What actions do
banks take when their capital ratios fall close to the regula-
tory limit? Their conclusion is that banks approaching the
limits imposed by regulators raise capital, and do not shed
loans. This conclusion is valuable, as it suggests that the
reaction of lenders to capital requirements is not to clamp
down on their borrowers. Regulatory constraints do not, by
themselves, appear to reduce the supply of loans.
I view Ediz, Michael, and Perraudin’s results as
preliminary. The authors provide a number of very inter-
esting descriptive statistics that provide support for these
conclusions. For example, they convincingly establish
(graphically) that the closer a bank’s capital (relative to
risk-weighted assets) gets to the regulatory trigger, the
more likely a bank is to increase its capital. But their
sophisticated econometric analysis has one fairly large diffi-
culty. The authors estimate a simple model in which banks
have an optimal or target level of capital in mind and
adjust slowly to this target. Looking at the numerical
results in the paper, one finds that banks are adjusting their
capital levels each year by more than the difference
between the current level and the target. That is, the esti-
mated adjustment rate exceeds one, meaning that the
banks are overshooting the target (and by more and more
each year).
The second paper, by Aggarwal and Jacques, is
entitled “Assessing the Impact of Prompt Corrective
Action on Bank Capital and Risk.” The authors attempt to
measure the impact of prompt corrective action (PCA) on
bank capital levels and bank risk; again, an issue clearly
worthy of study. In this work, Aggarwal and Jacques use
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data on bank balances for the years 1991-93. This allows
the assessment of banks’ behavior before and after the insti-
tution of PCA in 1992. The authors find that banks with
low levels of capital at the beginning of the period
increased their levels of capital by the end and reduced the
riskiness of their asset portfolios (using the authors’ chosen
measure).
While Aggarwal and Jacques’ conclusions are
plausible, can we really ascribe them to prompt corrective
action? In order to fully confirm the causal link from PCA
to the bank balance sheet changes they document, the
authors need to confront two important difficulties. First,
are there plausible alternative explanations for the find-
ings? What else happened in the 1991-93 period? And sec-
ond, does their measure of risk really track the quantity of
interest? Again, is there another, equally plausible inter-
pretation of the results? With respect to the first question,
a number of things happened during this period that may
have contaminated the results, making this an unfortunate
period to use for an attempt to isolate the impact of PCA.
First, 1992 was the year in which the 1988 Basle Capital
Accord was implemented in the United States. In prepara-
tion for this, banks began reporting risk-based capital in
1990-91. It seems likely that banks’ behavior during this
period was a reaction both to PCA and to the implementa-
tion of the Basle Capital Accord, and that sorting out their
relative impact will be very difficult. 
Second, the early 1990s was an unusual point in
what was an important cycle in the banking industry. Prior
to this, in the late 1980s through 1991, banks had taken
loan losses associated with their real estate portfolios.
Banks’ loan-loss reserves were depleted and their capital
was significantly reduced. The natural reaction of the
banks in 1992-93 was to rebuild their capital positions.
Was the overall reaction of bank capital during the
1991-93 period the result of prompt corrective action?
Maybe, but we do not yet have convincing proof.
Aggarwal and Jacques’ second set of results con-
cerns the impact of PCA on banks’ willingness to assume
risk. They measure bank risk exposure as the ratio of
risk-weighted assets to total assets, and presume that the
higher this ratio, the more risk a bank assumes per dollar of
book value. Unfortunately, this measures only credit risk,
and not very well. What about other sources of risk, such as
interest rate risk? I am led to conclude that they have not
convincingly shown that PCA reduced the overall riskiness
of banks’ assets.
In “Fair Value Accounting and Regulatory Capital
Requirements,” Yonetani and Katsuo examine how market
and regulatory discipline interact to affect Japanese banks.
The market might perceive that banks are undercapitalized
and might value their shares accordingly. But, Yonetani
and Katsuo hypothesize, there may be a separate influence
on the bank that comes when it actually hits its regulatory
limit. At this point, does the market punish the bank even
more? Or, does the market properly perceive the riskiness
of the bank’s asset position and value it correctly? The
authors conclude that bank earnings based on fair market
value are more volatile than those based on historical cost
and that the impact of this additional volatility depends on
the level of bank capital, suggesting that the two (negative)
effects reinforce one another.
Yonetani and Katsuo’s work is relevant in helping
us answer a much broader question than the one on which
they primarily focus: For the purposes of meeting regula-
tory capital requirements, at what frequency should we
require banks to mark their portfolios to market? This is an
extremely difficult question to answer. It seems that some
market value accounting is necessary, and so “never” is not
the right answer. But then, a very high frequency, even if it
were cheap to administer, does not seem to be the right
answer either. Should we insist that the bank’s capital, at
market prices, exceeds the regulatory minimum at every
instant? Probably not, as some portions of a bank’s portfo-
lio may experience significantly more high-frequency vola-
tility than low-frequency volatility. But we surely could
use an answer to this question, and more work in this area
would be very valuable.
The final paper in this group is Le and Sheehan’s
“Measuring the Relative Marginal Cost of Debt and
Capital for Banks.” In their study, these two authors ask
whether we can measure the impact of capital requirements
by looking at prices. The general idea of looking for the
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like a good one. Here, Le and Sheehan proceed by studying
the behavior of the difference between the cost of capital
and the cost of debt. Does this give us the information we
really want? 
In assessing their methods, one must ask whether
fluctuations in the cost of capital relative to debt are likely
to tell us anything about the degree to which capital
requirements bind. In trying to answer this question, first
ask whether the cost of capital will equal the cost of debt
even if there were no capital requirements. I think that the
answer to this must be no. First, capital is more risky than
debt, and so it should have a higher expected rate of return.
Second, even if deposit insurance cuts the link between the
marginal cost of debt and the level of capital, with costly
bankruptcy, the marginal cost of capital will depend on the
level of debt. As a result, anything that changes the riski-
ness of capital or the likelihood of bankruptcy will change
the cost of capital relative to debt—even if there is no capi-
tal requirement at all.
Looking briefly at Le and Sheehan’s empirical
results, I have two comments. First, it is very difficult to
measure the marginal cost of capital, which is what they
need. Most techniques will allow measurement of the aver-
age cost. Second, looking at the specifics of their results,
you see that the time path of their measure of how binding
the constraints are depends critically on exactly how they
choose to measure it. Is the deviation of the estimated cost
of capital from the estimated cost of debt calculated rela-
tive to the interest rate on Treasury bills or not? It turns
out to make a big difference what measure is used, and
since the authors provide no reason for one or the other, I
am left puzzled.
In thinking about capital regulation generally, the
problem that brings these four papers together is a funda-
mental one: What does it mean for banks to be capital con-
strained? The common methodology in addressing this
question is to look at the behavior of banks as they
approach the constraint imposed by regulators. But is this
likely to give us an answer to the question we really care
about? The one result that comes through in all of these
papers is that banks that are undercapitalized raise capital.
But surely undercapitalized banks will be under market
pressure at the same time they come under regulatory pres-
sure. Can we really say that the behavior we observe with
the regulations is different from the behavior we would
observe without them? 
I realize that in these comments I have raised more
questions than I have answered. My conclusion is that the
success of these papers, really, is in helping us to refine the
questions to which we need answers. After reading these
four interesting papers, I am left asking myself two ques-
tions to which we would like to know the answers: How is
it that required capital ratios work to affect bank behavior?
What are capital requirements really supposed to achieve?
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